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This article suggests that postconflict elections are a unique subset of transition
elections which deserve special attention. The authors describe the evolution of
postconflict elections, identify some of their more salient characteristics, and offer
preliminary lessons drawn from the recent experiences.
Throughout the 1980s, the phrase "transition elections" was employed constantly by
policymakers, democratic activists, and academic analysts. It generally referred to
multiparty elections occurring after years of nondemocratic rule, often in countries with
a prior history of democratic government. Elections in Argentina (1983), Uruguay
(1984), Philippines (1986), South Korea (1987), Pakistan (1988), and Chile (1989) exem-
plify the transition election phenomena and were featured exhibits in Samuel Hunting-
ton's notion of a worldwide third wave of democratization. 1
With the demolition of the Berlin wall in 1 989, the transition election moniker began
to be applied in three related, but somewhat different, settings: (1) initial elections in the
former communist countries of the Soviet bloc, with the series of elections between
March and June 1990 in East and Central Europe setting the stage; 2 (2) elections in sev-
eral African countries, where previous experiences with formal multiparty electoral prac-
tices were quite limited; and (3) elections that were scheduled following the cessation of
an internal armed conflict, often as an integral part of a negotiated settlement. It is this
last category of elections that is the subject of this article.
Our principal thesis is that postconflict elections are a unique subset of transition
elections which deserve special attention. Moreover, recent experiences with
postconflict elections provide a wealth of lessons for policymakers and democratic activ-
ists.
3 As we are constantly made aware, however, applying the specific lessons learned
from previous experiences in the difficult context of negotiating the cessation of a con-
flict is no easy task.
Treating postconflict elections as a discrete subject has assumed increased importance
as such elections have become the mechanism of choice for facilitating the passage from
civil war to peace. Moreover, the occurrence of postconflict elections has become an
important benchmark for the international community in assessing the institutionaliza-
tion of a peace process. Both the fact that an election has occurred and the quality of the
process have important implications for the withdrawal of international peacekeeping
forces, for the allocation of scarce international assistance resources, for beginning the
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process of reintegrating a country that has been detrimentally affected by civil war into
the community of nations, and for the creation of openings for external contacts, infor-
mation flow, and human rights interventions.
Setting the Stage
The post-Cold War era has witnessed the rise of intrastate conflicts that have under-
mined the very foundation of the state, generated massive migrations, and inflicted wide-
spread suffering on civilian populations. The collapse of the Soviet empire, the end of
superpower rivalry, the growth of ethnic nationalism and worsening economic condi-
tions in parts of Africa and elsewhere have undoubtedly contributed to this phenomenon.
Ethnic and religious minorities, tribal groups, ambitious warlords, and marginalized and
discriminated-against populaces have all raised the banner of revolt as they seek to re-
dress grievances.
The ferocity that has characterized these intrastate conflicts has forced the interna-
tional community to reassess various norms and practices that developed during the
Cold War. While the contours of a new order are not fully settled, recent experiences
have kindled a lively debate regarding such issues as forcible intervention in response to
gross human rights violations, more aggressive responses to humanitarian disasters, and
expanded notions of what peacekeeping operations might entail. Thus, paradoxically,
the same factors that have contributed to intrastate conflicts have created conditions for
their peaceful resolution.
As major international powers no longer see national conflicts from the prism of Cold
War ideology, they have aggressively sought peaceful solutions to seemingly intractable
and long-standing internal conflicts. The warring factions, meanwhile, bereft of outside
support and suffering from growing war fatigue, have come under intense pressure to
compromise. The recent spotlight on democracy and human rights has contributed a
recognized framework for reconciling political differences. Consequently, several civil
wars have terminated and the populations of a number of countries have once again
begun breathing in an atmosphere of relative peace and reconstructing their shattered
lives.
The Phenomenon Described
The 1989 elections in Namibia, although sui generis for a number of reasons, provided
the impetus for much of the more recent developments involving the use of elections as
part of a postconflict settlement. The story of these elections has been told in detail
elsewhere, so it is summarized only briefly here.4 The approach utilized in Namibia was
developed and authorized by the United Nations in 1978, but could be implemented
only after the major antagonists, South Africa and South West Africa People's Organiza-
tion (SWAPO), had fought to a standstill and the major powers no longer perceived any
advantage in extending the duration of the conflict. The UN formula called for an exten-
sive international presence in Namibia under UN auspices throughout the transition
period.
Most relevant to the present subject, the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)
was responsible for "supervision and control" over the planned elections in Namibia.
Supervision involved a hybrid between direct administration, which in Namibia was left
to the South African colonial authorities, and a more passive monitoring role, which had
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characterized the international community's involvement in many of the 1980s transi-
tion elections mentioned above. Nonetheless, the extensive nature of the supervision in
Namibia deserves underscoring. On the ground, it involved the presence of more than
1,700 election supervisors and 3,500 military personnel in a country with a population
of fewer than 2 million. More important, the UN had the responsibility to validate the
overall electoral process, which was the keystone for ensuring a cessation of the conflict
and the establishment of an independent Namibia. There was some recognition immedi-
ately after the Namibian elections that a new mechanism for resolving conflicts was
perhaps emerging, but it required utilization outside the very special circumstances of
Namibia for the approach to be fully appreciated. 5
The 1990 elections in Nicaragua provided the next test. Years of intrastate conflict
had resulted in a stalemate, but with the end of the Cold War there was a decrease in
superpower interest. The Central American governments had initiated a peace process
that placed considerable emphasis on the need to guarantee free and fair elections in
each of the countries of the region. This time, however, elections were being planned for
a member state of the United Nations, not a colonized territory. Nonetheless, the Nicara-
guan government invited both the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) to
monitor upcoming elections. Both organizations responded by establishing long-term
and large electoral monitoring teams in the country, marking the first time such exten-
sive exercises had been undertaken in a sovereign state. The efforts of the UN and OAS
teams, together with several nongovernmental organizations, contributed to an electoral
process in which all the key parties participated, the voters for the most part had an op-
portunity to cast their ballots free of intimidation, and after some difficult negotiations,
all parties accepted a process through which the ruling party was defeated. 6
There followed a series of elections in Angola (1992), Cambodia (1993), El Salvador
(1994), Mozambique (1994), Bosnia (1996), and Liberia (1997) in which the basic ele-
ments of the Namibia/Nicaragua, or postconflict election model, have been employed,
with appropriate modifications for the particulars of the circumstances. Several other
elections, including those in Haiti (1990 and 1995), Ethiopia (1992), South Africa
(1994), West Bank/Gaza (1996), and Albania (1997), also share many of the characteris-
tics of the postconflict election model. Its critical elements include (1) negotiation of a
formal peace accord, which calls, inter alia, for a cessation of hostilities and the occur-
rence of elections within a fixed period; (2) intensive administrative preparations for the
elections, involving negotiations concerning the legal framework, designation of the
election administrators, registration of parties and voters, and arrangements associated
with the procurement of appropriate electoral paraphernalia and its distribution through-
out the country within the requisite time frame; (3) responding to an often tenuous secu-
rity situation through the deployment of peacekeeping forces, civilian and police moni-
tors, and the demobilization of armed factions; (4) providing for effective participation
by refugees and displaced persons either by guaranteeing their safe return to their homes
prior to the elections or through absentee ballot and related procedures; and (5) the ex-
tensive involvement of the international community in administering, supervising,
monitoring, and otherwise assisting the process.
Perhaps the most important point that needs to be understood about postconflict
elections is that they are invariably organized under very difficult circumstances, al-
though the specific conditions differ from society to society, depending on the nature
and duration of the conflict, previous levels of economic and political development, and
the havoc wrought by the war. As a general rule, these postconflict countries are politi-
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cally devastated, often with weak interim governments responsible for organizing the
elections. Economically, the countries are characterized by high inflation, widespread
unemployment, and shortage of essential goods. Many of the countries face food short-
ages, and their agricultural and industrial production is quite slack. Transport and com-
munication infrastructures often are shattered, making the movements of people, goods,
and information difficult.
Postconflict societies also lack the institutional infrastructure required for democratic
elections. In many cases, a free press, independent judiciary, democratically oriented
organized political parties, and an independent election commission are either just being
formed or recovering from the physical, psychological, and financial consequences of
war. Further, because of the conflict, a climate of social distrust, antagonism, and frustra-
tion exists in postconflict societies, which makes political discourse, much less demo-
cratic contestation, exceedingly difficult. In fact, the elections represent more a repudia-
tion of the fighting than a choice among political alternatives, with the consequence that
the elected government does not necessarily have a popular mandate for specific pro-
grammatic choices.
Finally, as noted above, the security situation often remains tenuous. For example, El
Salvador is the only country mentioned in which demobilization of ex-combatants was
completed prior to elections. In Angola and Ethiopia warring factions kept part of their
armies clandestinely, while in Bosnia and Cambodia many parts of the country remained
under the control of militia who had not reconciled to the peace process and were loyal
to the parties contesting the elections. Consequently, the transformation of the politico-
military organizations into democratic political parties was hardly complete at the time
of the elections.
Efficacy of Postconflict Elections
In considering the efficacy of recent postconflict elections, it is important to be aware
that they have often been expected to accomplish multiple objectives, some of which are
not necessarily compatible. Like more conventional elections, postconflict ones are
designed to result in the formation of a new and democratically legitimate government.
However, they are also expected to consolidate a fragile peace by providing former com-
batants a legitimate arena for competition. Indeed, these elections are consciously
viewed as mechanisms to transform violent conflicts into peaceful competition for
power.
Of the recent postconflict elections, significant progress toward reconciliation has
occurred in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Mozambique; in these countries, the
former warring groups have been integrated into the emerging political system. Bosnia
enjoys relative peace but little reconciliation, and there is considerable concern that the
peace can be maintained only with the continuing presence of a rather significant NATO
force. The Cambodia situation is quite complex: the Khmer Rouge, who remain commit-
ted to the violent overthrow of the regime, have been marginalized, but new conflicts
have arisen between the former coalition partners, and more combatants are under arms
than when the peace accords were signed. While it is too early to draw firm conclusions
from the situation in Liberia following the 1997 elections, recent events suggest that
maintaining the peace will not be easy. Finally, fighting erupted in Angola immediately
after its 1992 elections, and all efforts to reconcile the warring parties have so far failed.
A second objective of postconflict elections is to initiate a democratization process
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within a country. It is assumed, often naively, that the conduct of reasonably free and fair
elections generates a momentum toward further democratization and that leaders who
assume power through electoral means will necessarily abide by democratic norms.
Here again, the record to date is mixed. While developments in several countries are
encouraging, for example, Namibia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, the experience in other
countries where postconflict elections transpired is sobering. The 1997 events in Cambo-
dia, where the coalition arrangement that had existed since the 1993 elections fell apart,
highlight the gossamer nature of the democratic transition under way in many of the
postconflict countries.
A third objective of postconflict elections is to signify a relatively political stability
within a country, warranting the implementation of a massive economic reconstruction
program with resources generated both internally and from donor agencies. Successful
postconflict elections have generally achieved this purpose, with consequent positive
economic growth. Given the devastation of the war, however, and the fact that serious
economic planning is often placed on hold during the period between the peace signing
and the occurrence of the elections, expectations for instantaneous economic improve-
ments are extremely high among the population, and indeed among the international
community, in the aftermath of the elections. These expectations pose an immediate
challenge to a new government, which often must rely on the willingness of the interna-
tional community to remain engaged rather than simply to declare victory and move on.
Role of the International Community
International assistance is essential not only for the organization of postconflict elec-
tions, but also to ensure their credibility and acceptance. The international community's
extensive role in several postconflict elections, however, has challenged basic develop-
ment principles regarding local ownership and empowerment. The justification for such
far-reaching involvement is based on an absolute mandate to stop the killing, the recog-
nition that failure to move ahead on elections may result in the breakdown of the peace,
an acceptance of the international community, however defined in a particular circum-
stance, as a necessary mediator and prodder, and the desire to maintain the time commit-
ments included in the peace accord.
The pattern and sequence of international electoral assistance has been straightfor-
ward, although there is considerable variation in the overall extent of the involvement.
During peace negotiations, the international community may provide the services of
legal luminaries and election experts to clarify critical issues regarding the nature and
timing of elections. If peace negotiations are successful, an intergovernmental organiza-
tion, such as the United Nations, Organization ofAmerican States, Organization for Co-
operation and Security in Europe, is often invited to take the lead in administering, su-
pervising, or monitoring the elections.
Inevitably, international organizations assume greater roles and responsibilities than
originally envisioned in order to solve pressing logistical, institutional, and political
problems. The fine line between technical assistance and political intervention is thin
indeed in the harsh realities of postconflict societies. Perhaps because of the number of
situations requiring such assistance, the quality of expertise available to help organize or
advise on the preparations for holding postconflict elections has improved immensely
during the past decade. In fact, the elections in Bosnia demonstrate that even in the most
difficult of circumstances, a technically adequate election can be achieved if the avail-
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ability of resources is not a significant constraint.
The precise nature of the international engagement may surprise some not familiar
with the phenomenon. The three post-Dayton Accords elections in Bosnia provide a
current example of international community roles in ensuring timely elections. Dayton
mandated national and municipal elections within nine months of the December 14,
1995, signing of the accords in Paris. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) was assigned responsibility for supervising the elections as well as for
monitoring human rights and verifying an arms reduction regime.
Unlike Namibia, supervision of the 1996 Bosnian elections became tantamount to
administration. The seven-member Provisional Election Commission (PEC) was chaired
by the head of the OSCE mission, and included three Bosnians and three other represen-
tatives of the international community. The PEC's international staff drafted the election
law, procured the election materials, supervised the voter registration process inside
Bosnia and in countries where Bosnian refugees resided, and developed the plan for the
procurement and distribution of all election paraphernalia.
The OSCE chairman in office (CIO), meanwhile, was required by Dayton to certify
that conditions in Bosnia were conducive to free and fair elections before the election
date could be set. Notwithstanding the fact that several key elements of the accords had
not been implemented, most notably relating to freedom of movement throughout the
country and the return of refugees, the Swiss foreign minister, who was serving as CIO at
the time, made the requisite certification in mid-June and authorized that the elections
be scheduled for September 14, nine months to the day from the signing of the accords.
Several weeks before the elections, however, the OSCE CIO and head of mission agreed
to postpone the municipal elections while proceeding with the national elections.
By election day, more than 1,000 OSCE election supervisors were in Bosnia. An Elec-
tions Appeals Subcommission, which was headed by a Norwegian judge and staffed by
lawyers and investigators seconded by foreign governments, addressed several critical
and controversial issues before and after the elections. More than 30,000 NATO troops,
who initially were directed to assume a detached perspective toward the election, even-
tually carried out key transportation and communication responsibilities, contributing
immeasurably to the, relatively speaking, administrative success of the elections. And for
election day, a separate OSCE team, numbering more than 1 ,200, was dispatched to the
country to monitor the elections.
In most other circumstances, this extensive international involvement abated soon
after the initial elections. However, Bosnia has proved more nettlesome, resulting in the
same high degree of international involvement in 1997 municipal elections and 1998
national elections. These latter elections were noteworthy for the much improved admin-
istrative processes, for the more competitive nature of the overall campaign, and the
more unconstrained environment in which the elections took place.
Admittedly, Bosnia reflects unique circumstances, much as Cambodia did a few years
earlier, which had previously been identified as the most costly and extensive interna-
tional engagement in a postconflict election exercise. In most other circumstances, the
international community engagement has seemed modest by comparison. Nonetheless,
even in these less extravagant settings, the international community role has been mo-
mentous and, usually, critical to the occurrence and success of the elections.
Mozambique offers an interesting contrast to Bosnia and Cambodia. Notwithstanding
Mozambique's much more limited resources and a less explicit mandate, the UN and
others in the international community ensured that the 1994 elections took place and
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that all parties participated. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the UN role in
Mozambique was the provision of more than $17 million to the political parties, ostensi-
bly to provide them a basis for conducting a meaningful campaign, but viewed more
cynically as an inducement to participate in the process.
Cost and Timing of Postconflict Elections
The cost of planning, organizing, and monitoring elections, given the extenuating cir-
cumstances affecting postconflict societies, tends to be comparatively high. The reasons
for such high costs are understandable. As noted earlier, postconflict societies lack even
the rudimentary transportation and communication infrastructure essential for holding
nationwide elections. Undertaking nationwide voter education programs and establish-
ing polling stations in remote areas are inevitably more expensive in these circumstances
than in more traditional settings. Moreover, because peace is at stake and the interna-
tional community is committed to supporting the elections, there is real pressure not to
compromise the integrity of any aspect of the process. These factors often contribute to
the utilization of electoral mechanisms that would be deemed inappropriate if the coun-
try were financing the election without international support. Limited industrial capacity
necessitates that many basic electoral commodities — paper, pencils, boxes, typewriters,
computers, and vehicles — must be imported at considerable expenditures. Resources
are also needed to create minimal infrastructure for democratic elections; as in the case of
Mozambique, the international community has provided assistance to struggling politi-
cal parties to enable them to participate in the electoral process.
The high costs of postconflict elections raise several issues that deserve reflection.
One obvious issue concerns the opportunity cost of the resources spent on postconflict
elections. It has been suggested that these resources could be allocated instead to ad-
dressing the major social and economic problems facing these countries, including civil-
ian security, repair of shattered physical infrastructure, and basic social programs such as
health care and education for marginalized groups.
Another issue relates to the precedent for expenditure set by the postconflict elec-
tions. In the absence of outside assistance, many countries simply cannot afford to dis-
burse a fraction of the resources spent to conduct the postconflict election on subsequent
elections. At the same time, certain precedents have been created regarding the adminis-
trative processes, as well as sophisticated technologies, that were utilized during such
postconflict elections. Thus, there is an expectation that international assistance will be
provided to ensure a successful second and even third election. While in many circum-
stances such assistance has been forthcoming, an alternative would involve utilizing less
resource-intensive administrative processes and technologies that are more appropriate
to the economic and technological resources of the country.
A further factor that contributes to reliance on seemingly inappropriate administrative
electoral mechanisms relates to the timetables established for organizing postconflict
elections. These timetables, as observed above, are often dictated by political consider-
ations rather than a rational assessment of the time necessary to prepare adequately for
the elections. In several instances, the inevitable consequence has been a temporary
postponement of the election, while in other situations the timetable was maintained at
all costs, including those relating to the credibility of the process.
Among the adverse consequences associated with unrealistic election timetables is
that the demobilization of combatants has often not been completed before elections.
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Therefore, some political forces manage to maintain their military capabilities and, if the
election outcomes are not to their satisfaction, they are in a position to resume a military
offensive. This course of events happened in Angola, where the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) resumed the fighting after losing the 1992 elec-
tions, and in Cambodia where the number of soldiers loyal to the factions increased
dramatically following the peace accords.
Rigid timelines often have, in addition, a negative consequence on the implementa-
tion of an effective civic and voter education program, thus constraining the potential
democratizing impact of the elections. For example, intermediary organizations that
sought to implement voter education programs in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique
found it extremely difficult to print literature, instruct trainers, and reach remote areas
within the stipulated time frame.
Policy Considerations
There are two schools of thought regarding the increased reliance on postconflict elec-
tions as a tool for maintaining the end of an armed conflict. The first argues that notwith-
standing one outright failure, Angola, and a few instances where there has been both
progress and backsliding, Cambodia, the overall record of postconflict elections is posi-
tive. While appropriate lessons must be drawn from prior experiences and an understand-
ing of the particular context in which the model is to be applied is absolutely critical, the
form is sound and deserves to be at the forefront of the tools utilized by a negotiator
trying to end an intrastate conflict.
The second school of thought is more skeptical of the overall record emerging from
the experiences of the past few years. The high costs and rigid timelines associated with
these elections have led to a search for functional alternatives, such as interim power-
sharing arrangements, which might allow for the reconstruction process to begin without
the immediate pressures of organizing and conducting an election.
While the limitations of postconflict elections must be understood, we are convinced
that such elections will continue to figure prominently in future efforts to move beyond
intrastate conflicts. With this reality in mind, we suggest that policymakers consider the
following factors in assessing the prospects for a successful postconflict election: (1) the
relative presence of democratic traditions and participatory social institutions such as
voluntary associations, an emerging middle class economically independent of the state,
independent media, and local political units; (2) the presence of ethnic cleavages and
the nature of political mobilization, particularly the degree to which political mobiliza-
tion relies on ethnic or sectarian appeals; and (3) progress toward demobilization of
combatants, since this deters losing parties from abrogating the accords and relying on
the military option for achieving power.
Once it is decided that an election process will form an integral part of a postconflict
accord, the following policy considerations deserve note. First, the parties to the conflict
should play an active role negotiating the electoral rules of the game rather than having
these rules determined preemptively by an external actor; at the same time, an external
actor may be required to ensure that the negotiations continue and to suggest approaches
for breaking deadlocks. Second, the electoral rules and mechanisms should be kept
simple to ensure that they can be easily understood by the populace and that they can be
replicated in future elections. Third, a realistic timeline with objective benchmarks
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should be employed, as the constant need to revise the timeline and postpone the elec-
tions serves as a confidence destabilizer and exacerbates feelings of suspicion and mis-
trust.
Fourth, the pre-election period should be used to rebuild those institutions which are
critical to both meaningful elections and democratic consolidation; these institutions
include an independent election commission, democratically oriented political parties,
independent media, and nongovernmental organizations that are prepared to assume
responsibility for monitoring the elections and conducting voter education programs.
Fifth, given the degree of mistrust that often exists within a postconflict society, the
introduction of confidence-building measures, which might involve authorizing the
presence of international observers and requiring periodic certifications that conditions
are conducive to free and fair elections should be employed during both the pre- and
postelection periods.
Finally, the international community should recognize that a successful election
process is only a step in a reconstruction effort, and that a long-term commitment is
required following elections to sustain both reconciliation and democratization. Admit-
tedly, recent practice has not necessarily conformed to this admonition. Too often the
actions, as opposed to the rhetoric, of the international community reflect a shift back to
"business as usual" rather than a sincere appreciation of the fact that restoration of trust
and dignity among a population that has experienced a bitter intrastate conflict is never
a short-term endeavor. *®
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